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VIEWPOINT 
Limiting The Role Of Patents In Technology Transfer 
Federal policy since 1980 has reflected 
an increasingly confident presumption 
that patenting discoveries made in the 
course of government-sponsored re-
search is the most effective way to pro-
mote technology transfer and commercial 
development of those discoveries in the 
private sector. Whereas policymakers in 
the past may have 
thought that the best way 
to achieve widespread use 
of government-sponsored 
research was to make the 
results freely available to 
the public, the new pro-
patent policy stresses the 
need for exclusive rights 
as an incentive for indus-
try to undertake the fur-
ther investment to bring 
new products to market. 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg* 
In 1980, Congress passed the Steven-
son-Wydler Innovation Act, which made 
technology transfer an integral part of 
the research and development responsi-
bilities of federal laboratories and their 
employees, and the Bayh-Dole Act, 
which reversed the prior practice of 
some agencies of retaining public owner-
ship of discoveries made 
through federal research 
funding in universities and 
small businesses (see Au-
gust 1993 issue, page 45). 
Later legislative enact-
ments and executive or-
ders have broadened and 
tightened the provisions 
of the Bayh-Dole and 
Stevenson-Wydler Acts 
wherever loopholes have 
appeared that might leave 
potentially valuable dis-
coveries unpatented. 
Although this pro-
patent policy may make a 
good deal of sense for 
some government-spon-
sored discoveries, there 
are reasons to suspect 
that it makes little sense 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg is a 
professor of law at the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law 
School in Ann Arbor; Mich. 
Under the system we 
have in place today, wher-
ever federally sponsored 
inventions are made, 
whether in government, 
for others. In our eager-
ness to avoid the inadequacies of the 
public-domain approach, we may have 
moved too quickly and too emphatically 
in the opposite direction, to the point 
that patent rights in some government-
sponsored discoveries may actually be 
undermining, rather than supporting, 
incentives to develop new products and 
bring them to market. It is time to 
reevaluate the role of patents in tech-
nology transfer-on the basis of more 
than a decade of actual experience 
rather than uncorroborated fears-and 
consider how the present system might 
be improved. 
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Ann Arbor, MI 48109. Responses intended for publi-
cation should be addressed to THE JoURNAL OF NIH 
RESEARCH, 1444 I Street, N.W., Suite 1000, Washing-
ton, DC 20005, This article was adapted from re-
marks presented to the Congressional Biomedical 
Research Caucus in Washington, D.C., June 28, 1993. 
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university, or private labo-
ratories, if anyone involved in the re-
search project wants the discovery to be 
patented, chances are it will be patented. 
Thus, for example, if a government agen-
cy or university has no interest in pursu-
ing patent rights in a discovery, the 
individual investigator who made the dis-
covery may step in and claim them. 
Now, all of this makes a good deal of 
sense if we want all government-spon-
sored research discoveries to be patent-
ed. But do we? 
One sign of trouble in paradise for 
federal technology-transfer policy is the 
reaction of industry trade groups to the 
filing of patent applications in 1991 by 
NIH on thousands of partial complemen-
tary DNA (eDNA) sequences of un-
known function. These trade groups are 
not composed of naive, idealistic scien-
tists who have limited experience with 
patents and limited interest in product 
development. Their members are the 
same hard-nosed, profit-maximizing 
firms that Congress is trying to entice 
into developing products out of gov-
ernment-sponsored inventions through 
its patent policy. 
Position statements from the Pharma-
ceutical Manufacturers Association 
(PMA) and from two biotechnology trade 
groups that have since merged, the In-
dustrial Biotechnology Association (IBA) 
and the Association of Biotechnology 
Companies (ABC), contradicted the hy-
pothesis that patents on eDNA sequences 
are necessary to protect the interests of 
firms that might develop related products 
in the future. PMA and IBA both urged 
that NIH not seek patent protection on 
eDNA sequences whose biological func-
tion is unknown. ABC supported the NIH 
decision to seek patent protection, but 
only as a means of generating revenues 
for the government. Indeed, even ABC 
urged that the patents be licensed on a 
nonexclusive basis so as not to block de-
velopment projects in industry. 
These reactions to the eDNA patent 
applications alone are enough to call into 
question the strong pro-patent tilt of cur-
rent policy. It may be that under current 
law NIH had little choice but to pursue 
patent rights, but I am at least tentative-
ly persuaded that later product develop-
ment would probably be better served by 
leaving the sequence information in the 
public domain. This seems to suggest at 
the very least that federal agencies ought 
to have more flexibility to determine that 
some inventions would be better left in 
the public domain. 
Can we say anything more specific 
than that at this point? One way of ap-
proaching that question is to consider 
how it is that patents are supposed to 
promote product development in order 
to identify circumstances in which the 
patenting strategy is unlikely to work. 
The argument for patenting research 
discoveries as a means of promoting 
their later development into useful prod-
ucts is that patents permit the firms that 
invest in product development to reap 
the rewards of their investment through 
commercially effective monopolies. That 
argument is generally true when a com-
pany obtains a patent on an end product 
that is sold to consumers. 
Somewhat less effective are process 
patents covering a specific use of an un-
patented product. The trouble with these 
so-called use patents is that as long as 
there are other uses for the product that 
are not covered by the patent, the patent 
holder cannot stop competitors from sell-
ing the unpatented product itself and 
thereby driving down its price. If the 
product is available from a variety of 
sources, it may be impossible to monitor 
what purchasers are using it for. 
Another, even less effective, type of 
patent covers starting materials or pro-
cesses used in making an unpatented end 
product. Such patents do not prevent a 
competitor from making the product from 
different materials or through a different 
process, or even from using the patented 
materials overseas and then importing 
the end product into the United States. 
Such a patent may also be difficult to en-
force because of the practical problems 
involved in detecting and proving in-
fringement in the manufacturing process. 
Weaker still, as a device to keep com-
petitors out of the market, is a patent 
covering products or processes that are 
used only during product development. 
Not only is it difficult to detect and 
prove infringement of such a patent, but 
often the only effective remedy will be 
monetary damages because an injunc-
tion against future use of the invention 
will not thwart the efforts of a competi-
tor who has already finished using it. 
So firms that are interested in devel-
oping end products for sale to con-
sumers are unlikely to see patents on 
research tools as a very effective means 
of protecting their market exclusivity. 
Such patents may generate royalty in-
come, and that prospect may make it 
profitable to develop further research 
tools in the private sector, but patents 
are unlikely to enhance the incentives of 
firms to develop end products through 
the use of those research tools. 
On the other hand, one firm's research 
tool may be another firm's end product. 
This is particularly so in the contempo-
rary biotechnology industry, in which re-
search is big business, and there is money 
to be made by developing and marketing 
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research tools for use by other firms. For 
example, even as PMA and IBA were call-
ing on NIH to dedicate its eDNA se-
quence information to the public, new 
firms were being formed to do further 
eDNA sequencing in the private sector, 
presumably with the hope of obtaining 
their own patent rights. It may well make 
sense to have this particular task per-
formed in the private sector, and patents 
may enhance the incentives of firms to 
step in and do it. On the other hand, it 
may make more sense to leave this infor-
mation in the public domain, even if that 
means that the government has to con-
tinue to bear the cost of generating it. 
There are reasons to be wary of 
patents on research tools. Competing 
Patent rights in some 
governmentsponsored 
discoveries may actually be 
undermining, rather than 
supporting, incentives to 
develop new products and 
bring them to market. 
firms may hesitate to request licenses for 
fear of revealing the directions of their 
own research. Moreover, a large research 
project might require access to a great 
many research tools; if each of these 
tools requires a separate license and roy-
alty payment, the costs and administra-
tive burden could mount quickly. 
Another danger is that a company might 
refuse to make a patented research tool 
available to competitors at any price. Or, 
patent holders might find it more lucra-
tive to license research-tool patents on 
an exclusive rather than a nonexclusive 
basis, in the process choking off the re-
search and development of other firms. 
Basic-research activities might also be 
affected. For years, this country has sus-
tained a flourishing biomedical-research 
enterprise, in which investigators have 
drawn heavily on discoveries that their 
predecessors left in the public domain. 
Even if exclusive rights enhance private 
incentives to develop further research 
tools, they could do significant harm to 
the overall research enterprise by in-
hibiting the effective use of existing ones. 
Research tools may therefore be one 
example of the sort of discovery for 
which exclusive rights do more harm 
than good. There are undoubtedly others 
as well. Certain fundamental inventions 
with a wide range of applications may be 
more effectively exploited if left in the 
public domain or otherwise made freely 
available to all than if patented and li-
censed on an exclusive basis. The ab-
sence of patent protection on fundamen-
tal techniques for producing hybridomas 
and monoclonal antibodies does not seem 
to have significantly retarded the devel-
opment and patenting of commercial 
products using those technologies. 
The time is ripe to take a critical look 
at the actual operation of our technolo-
gy-transfer policy over the past decade 
and see how well it is working. This task 
calls for more than an examination of ag-
gregate statistics on the percentage of 
patented inventions that have been li-
censed. It would be useful to know 
whether those inventions have led to the 
development of commercial products, 
and whether those products are protect-
ed by other patents that would provide a 
comparable degree of market exclusivity 
even if the government-sponsored inven-
tion had been left in the public domain. It 
would be useful to know what effect 
those patents have had on the research 
and development of competitors of the 
licensee or on other would-be licensees 
who did not win the exclusive license. 
The rhetoric surrounding federal 
technology-transfer policy suggests that 
whatever is good for industry must be in 
the public interest. This is a vast over-
simplification of the issue. The private 
sector responds to the profit incentives 
created by whatever policies the gov-
ernment puts in place. Whenever the 
government offers new property rights, 
one would expect someone to step for-
ward to claim them. It doesn't necessar-
ily follow that those property rights are 
on balance creating new social value 
that will make all of us better off. 
I believe that patents have a critical 
role to play in promoting technology 
transfer. But the incentives created by 
patent rights in government-sponsored 
inventions would do little to compensate 
for the damage we could do to our re-
search enterprise if we allocate too 
much of our new knowledge to private 
owners and too little to the public do-
main. Government is uniquely situated 
to enrich our public domain. We should 
be wary of disabling the government 
from performing this critical function in 
our eagerness to enhance private incen-
tives to put existing discoveries to use.l 
